Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;  
A New Perspective

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Every participant in the Six-Party Talks supports the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Yet, the goal seems as elusive as ever. Why is that so? This article reviews what North Korea wants in return for denuclearization, what the Western Three (South Korea, Japan and the United States) want in return for their concessions and what the pitfalls of the process of denuclearization might be. In reviewing the matter, the article also discusses the prospect of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone.

Keywords: denuclearization, Six-Party Talks, the Korean Peninsula, nonproliferation, a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone

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1. Introduction

All the countries concerned, including North Korea, wish the Korean Peninsula to be denuclearized. The Six Party Talks declaration of September 2005\(^2\) stated so. Security Council resolutions also said so without any Council member voting against.\(^3\) The difference is whether a country is willing to pay the price for it. The United States, South Korea and Japan (in this paper they are called “the Three”) take a variety of steps to induce or force North Korea to give up nuclear weapons program. The United States at one time considered military options to stop the program and is now prepared to offer considerable rewards if North Korea abandons it. The other parties to the Six-Party Talks, China and Russia, support denuclearization but seem not ready to pay too much of a cost or to use coercive measures. The difference stems from the different perceptions of the threat from North Korea. The Three are frequently threatened verbally by North Korea; that sounds so outrageous that many do not take it seriously any longer, but North Korea still continues its threats to make Seoul or Tokyo into a fireball. The latest development was the South Korean experience of a number of provocative attacks in 2010. Thus, the Three now take the emerging nuclear threat from North Korea very seriously.

Even though North Korea has agreed a number of times to give up its nuclear weapons program, or at least a part of it, the program has been steadily making progress. Why have the Six-Party Talks not stopped the North Korean nuclear program? Skeptics argue that North Korea did not really mean to give up its ambitions to build up its “nuclear deterrence” as it calls it now. But, North Korea made tactical retreat from time to time when it thought they helped it duck the pressure on it or win political or economic concessions from the other countries. The Three were lured into the illusion that North Korea is intent on giving up its nuclear program and provided a variety of

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economic assistances and concessions such as the U.S. de-listing of North Korea from the State Department’s designation as a state that sponsors terrorism.

History shows few cases of countries that voluntarily gave up efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Soon after the United States obtained nuclear weapons, it started to prevent other countries from acquiring them but failed to stop the Soviet Union and France. The Soviet Union tried to stop China from gaining nuclear weapons but failed. Then came the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968. The initial successes of the NPT in keeping nation states nonnuclear included Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Germany, Canada, Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland. In many cases, it was more the diplomatic intervention of the United States combined with the offer of a security guarantee that moved those countries to accept the legal obligation of the NPT to forego the nuclear option. The countries in the Warsaw Pact may have felt they did not really have the freedom to think about getting nuclear weapons for themselves. Early cases of failure were those of India and Israel. Neither of them signed the NPT and both eventually acquired nuclear weapons.

The period after the end of the Cold War has been a more volatile period for nuclear non-proliferation. The Iraqi case was one where the use of military force was involved in stopping the acquisition of nuclear weapons. If it were not for the blunder of invading Kuwait, the Hussein regime in Iraq could have survived and might have gotten close to acquiring nuclear weapons. The Libyan case was a one where intelligence and interdiction efforts triggered diplomatic pressure on the country to finally make it give up its nuclear weapons program. The South African case was a unique case involving a regime change in which a severely isolated white-supremacist government that sought nuclear weapons for its protection was forced to change and during the process came to a decision to give up its nuclear weapons.

For the Thee, who feel threatened by the North Korean nuclear weapons, the primary question is how to denuclearize North Korea peacefully; i.e., without recourse to the use of military force. These countries realize that there may be some price to be paid for the North Korean abandonment of its nuclear option. But the price should not be so exorbitant as to make parliamentary approval of such package almost impossible.

For South Korea, it is very much inconceivable to push for a military option to denuclearize North Korea. Japan is in no position to propose a military option for denuclearization purposes given its constitution that “renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”

Without the support of South Korea and Japan, the United States can hardly push for a military option.

2. What Does North Korea Want?

(1) Political recognition

Then, if the Three should negotiate with North Korea for a voluntary deal to denuclearize itself, what would be the price for it? Political? Military? Or economic? North Korea has insisted many times it wants mutual recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations and the conclusion of a peace treaty with the United States. If all that North Korea wanted was such political recognition, it would have been easier for the United States. But North Korea does not seem to be satisfied with only such political concessions.

(2) Security guarantee

It is often said that North Korea is seriously concerned about regime survival and thus wants to win a security guarantee from the United States. Washington did offer a security guarantee as early as 1994 when it signed the Agreed Framework with North Korea. It repeated that offer in the 2005 Joint Declaration of the Six-Party Talks. It is not clear that North Korea would be satisfied with a mere documental commitment to nonaggression or non-use of force. The Three, for their part, have learned in other contexts that such an assurance has to be supported by some physical evidence.

Thus, it is not unexpected that when North Korea talks about denuclearization, it insists on the denuclearization of the peninsula; i.e., both North and South Koreas. As the Three seek firm verification of the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear facilities, North Korea may ask for reciprocal verification of South Korean facilities. This is in a way already provided for through the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol to that safeguards pact. For North Korea, if it resumes implementation of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and concludes an additional protocol to it, there will be a mutual verification based on equal legal obligations between North and South Koreas.

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5 [http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/af paragraph III 1)]
North Korea has insisted that it must verify the absence of nuclear weapons in American bases in South Korea to prove the denuclearization of the peninsula. The United States has already withdrawn all tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and declares that it has no intention to redeploy them. So, there is not much of a substantive question in committing itself not to deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea. But the verification of that commitment at each American military base in South Korea may be a problem. Similar question may arise when the United States and Russia start negotiations for the reduction or removal of nonstrategic nuclear weapons if either one of them starts insisting on verification. Strategic reduction/removal is easier to verify. They very often verify the destruction/removal of delivery vehicles which are bigger and exclusively used for strategic nuclear weapons. The verification of non-strategic nuclear weapons reduction/removal is more difficult because the delivery vehicles are smaller and very often dual purpose. Korean Peninsula denuclearization efforts may learn from U.S.-Russian arms control exercises, or the Korean Peninsula may become a test case for the U.S.-Russian exercises.

The Three and North Korea may also agree on additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards verification. Taking an example from U.S.-Soviet arms control, they may agree on an Open Sky agreement allowing mutual overflights of intelligence aircraft. They may mutually agree to allow soil, water and air sampling for radio-nuclide collection at any time and any place.

Is the denuclearization of the peninsula enough for North Korea? If North Korea is seriously concerned about a nuclear threat from the United States, it should be concerned not only about land-based nuclear weapons potentially stationed in South Korea but also about the U.S. naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons and long-range missiles stationed on the U.S. mainland. There is virtually no way to control naval vessels moving around the seas, and the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are subjects of negotiations between the United States and Russia. Thus, if North Korea brings up these issues, it may spell the end of negotiations.

(3) No more extended deterrence

North Korea from time to time demands that South Korea and Japan should renounce their protection under American extended nuclear deterrence. This may be a way to at least partially satisfy its concern about nuclear threats from naval vessels and ICBMs.

From the South Korean and Japanese points of view, the extended nuclear deterrence is to meet not only the nuclear threat but also a massive conventional arms
threat and other nonconventional threats, such as from chemical and biological weapons. After a series of intensive exchanges between Japan and the United States, Washington issued its Nuclear Posture Review in March 2010 setting a goal to achieve an international environment that would enable the United States to state that, as a matter of policy, the sole purpose of nuclear weapon is to deter the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by an opponent.7

The application of such a policy to the Korean Peninsula would mean working to reduce conventional forces massed along the DMZ, to bring North Korea into the Chemical Weapons Convention, under which it would be obliged to destroy all its chemical weapons, and to ascertain that North Korea fully complies with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and does not possess or deploy biological weapons. The Three are all parties to the chemical and biological weapons conventions. Thus, unlike possible conventional forces disengagement arrangement along the DMZ, North Korea would consider its compliance with the chemical and biological conventions as a unilateral concession on its part that must be paid for outside the nuclear deal. None of these goals would be easy to achieve, but they must be if the Three are to seek a reduced role for nuclear weapons.

(4) Economic concessions

Given its desperate economic situation, North Korea has demanded economic concessions from the Three and is likely to do so in future negotiations as well. The Three have expressed their readiness to provide economic assistance in return for North Korean denuclearization. The past cases show that such assistance may include the provision of nuclear power generating reactors or nonnuclear fuel for conventional power generation, food and agricultural assistance and general economic development assistance.

The appetite for such assistance, however, seems to have dwindled among the Three. This is due basically to a sense of disillusionment in that North Korea did not fulfill the denuclearization commitment it made; in return, Pyongyang rewarded them by the revelation of uranium enrichment activities (another way to make nuclear weapon material besides separating plutonium) and the nuclear explosive tests.

Added to this disillusionment may be the economic difficulties experienced by each one of the Three. Japan, for example, promised major economic assistance to North Korea in its bilateral declaration with North Korea in 2003. Some speculated at that time the package could be worth over US$10 billion. That was a time when Japan was

finally showing signs of recovery from the long economic stagnation it experienced during the 1990s. Then came the 2008 severe economic setback caused by the “Lehman Shock.” Thus, the administrations of the Three will have far greater a difficulty today winning approval for any economic assistance package even if it were agreed on in the Six-Party Talks or in any other framework.

3. What the Three Want from North Korea

In return for their offer of assistance the Three sought to gain a series of commitments from North Korea. First and foremost is the abandonment of nuclear weapons program by North Korea, but there have been other concessions sought by the Three as well.

(1) Military aspects: denuclearization plus

First, the Three have sought military concessions on nonnuclear matters. The abandonment of chemical and biological weapons is important if the Three were to seek a reduced role for extended nuclear deterrence over Japan and South Korea. Disengagement of conventional forces amassed along the DMZ is another proposal for de-escalation of the tension between the North and the South. Very often those who were eager to achieve denuclearization tended to brush aside the other military aspects as an unnecessary additional burden on dealing with North Korea and one that makes a deal almost impossible to achieve. There is certainly that element, and after all, any grand bargain may only be realized by a step-by-step approach. If that is so, attempts should still be made to leave enough incentives for North Korea to continue to engage in negotiations proceeding to a next stage. In that sense, the Three should not give all possible concession to North Korea in the first stage. They should not play all their cards at the first deal but retain some for later.

In the status quo ante North Korean success in exploding nuclear devices, its massive conventional forces combined with chemical and biological threats were the mainstay of its deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and South Korea. North Korea, therefore, may resist giving up those means of deterrence on top of giving up its nuclear weapons program. It may say, “We will be left with no tools of deterrence to stop the Americans or South Koreans.”
Disengagement along the DMZ is mutual so it can be a stand-alone deal. But North Korea may claim that as far as chemical and biological weapons are concerned, its side is the only one that is required to take dismantling actions that substantially reduce its deterrence capability, even though for the Three it is only a step to come into line with de facto international standards. Realistically, in order to move North Korea in this direction the Three may have to provide additional incentives. If the Three can reduce the role of extended nuclear deterrence and promote movement toward a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, this may be a price worth paying. Indeed, the dismantlement of chemical and biological weapons and their programs have to be strictly verified and made irreversible.

(2) Human rights and humanitarian aspects

Again, those who are eager to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea tend to hate human rights and humanitarian issues, as they are definitely distractions to their efforts and the last thing North Korea wants to discuss at the Six-Party Talks. The North Korean delegates very often walked out of the negotiating room the moment any one of the Three raised the issue. But it is an urgent one that cannot be overlooked. There are three dimensions to this issue.

Japanese dimension

For the Japanese people the primary concern is the fate of those Japanese who were abducted more than 30 years ago for a variety of espionage purposes. Not only it is bizarre and inhumane to abduct totally innocent young boys and girls and force them to teach espionage agents the Japanese language and customs but to keep them for over thirty years is the ultimate in inhumanity. Not only do the abductees themselves suffer but their family members also suffer from unimaginable torment. It draws tears from the Japanese people when they hear that abductees’ parents are aging and fading away from the world without having a chance to see their loved ones again. With such popular outrage in Japan, the government will not be able to underwrite any economic deal that would involve major Japanese contribution until the matter is settled.

South Korean dimension

It is estimated that as many as 100 Japanese may have been abducted by North Korea, but the estimated number of South Korean abductees far exceeds that of the Japanese. By one estimate it reaches over 400. But in comparison to Japan, there seems to be less discussion of the issue in South Korean political and media circles. This may
be due to the fact that South Korea has been exposed to so many outrageous acts by North Korea that the abductions alone cannot be dominant. Certainly, South Korea has experienced the bombing of a passenger jet, the mass killing of Cabinet ministers, the sinking of a corvette, and shelling of an island, and it is still under further threats. The issue of family reunions also continues to live.

Even then, for South Korean families, relatives and the nation as a whole, this is an issue that cannot be easily overlooked for the sake of striking a political deal over denuclearization. The issue is the same for South Koreans as for Japanese. It is inhumane to hold innocent abductees for such a long time and keep them from reuniting with their families and loved ones.

**North Korean dimension**

While the sufferings of those outside the North are terrible, that of those who are inside North Korea is beyond imagination; there is suffering from food shortages and malnutrition, the deprivation of basic living needs, a total denial of the freedom of expression, and no access to outside information, to name a few. Experts state that there is no comparison to the situation in the former East Germany. The worst comes when North Koreans are seen expressing any dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. They are put in political concentration camps or reeducation camps, or subjected to torture and mistreatment. Quite a number die of various causes.

Even when North Koreans succeed in escaping to northeast China, they are under a constant threat of arrest and deportation back to North Korea. Imagine what kind of treatment would be waiting for those who are deported. It is inhumane treatment of what are clearly “refugees” under the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention.⁸

There are low-level efforts to assist refugees in the Three but the efforts need to be reinvigorated to give hope to those who have risked their lives to seek freedom and an opportunity to fully express their human potential. The governments of the Three should strengthen their efforts to persuade the Chinese and other governments to offer full protection and assistance to those who seek refuge and at least not send them back to North Korea.

This situation is, in a way, reminiscent of the Solzhenitsyn affair during the Cold War. The West considered the treatment of those who criticized the regime and those who wished to emigrate from the Soviet Union outrageous, but in order to ease the fate of those who were in desperate situations, the West from time to time struck a deal to extract concessions from the Soviet Union in the form of the release of those who were

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denied emigration or imprisoned in a gulag. Such was the case of Solzhenitsyn. The Three might consider occasionally striking such deals.

**(3) The other aspects: behaving as a normal state**

Perhaps not as serious as the military aspect or the human rights and humanitarian aspect, the overall behavior of North Korea is very much out of step with normal states around the world. Examples are the state involvement in manufacturing counterfeit currencies, duplicating and black-marketing commercial products, and producing and selling illegal drugs abroad. We have seen cases of countries treating such crimes leniently but pursuing them as a state policy goal is something totally out of step with the conduct of a civilized state. North Korea may consider that it is technically still in a legal state of war with the United States and thus is allowed to take those actions under the international laws of war. But it is abnormal to continue such conduct after near 60 years of *de facto* peace since the armistice agreement was signed. Conclusion of a peace treaty with North Korea may create a situation in which North Korea will lose any such excuse and will have to behave as a normal state in accordance with the 21st century code of international relationships.

**4. What Should Be Avoided**

A diplomatic solution through the Six-Party Talks or otherwise is definitely better than military confrontation or coercive measures. Therefore, the doors of diplomacy should be kept open and attempts should be made to entice North Korea to such a solution. But the history of nearly two decades of engagement with North Korea on the issue of denuclearizing the peninsula has taught a number of lessons, and they have to be borne in mind to avoid any repetition of mistakes and to bring about a real solution to the problem.

**Avoid a partial deal**

There are basically two ways to make nuclear bombs. One is to use enriched uranium and the other is to use plutonium. The 1994 Agreed Framework did close the door to the plutonium path but did not fully block the uranium path. Thus, while the Three worked to provide two light water reactors in return for the dismantlement of a graphite-moderated reactor, North Korea quietly started to work on the alternative path. Thus, a partial deal does not make a sense and has to be avoided.
Plutonium production involves irradiation of uranium in a certain type of nuclear reactor and separating plutonium from either spent fuel or irradiated uranium. It requires a number of facilities and leaves certain radioactive traces. Hence, it is easier to discover and keep track of. In contrast, uranium enrichment does not leave much of a trace except for the acquisition of uranium ore as source material, centrifuges, and a facility to house them. If a laser method to enrich uranium is developed, it would become even harder to uncover any hidden enrichment activities. The Three may cooperate to find ways to uncover and monitor such activities for the eventuality when North Korea agrees to cessation of its nuclear weapons program and a requirement arises to verify that no clandestine activities are under way.

**Never buy an unverifiable deal**

One day North Korea says it agrees to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Wonderful! But, how do you verify it? Do you give all the rewards for such a commitment without verification? Voices may rise to call for giving it a try.

There will be a great temptation to do so, but it should be resisted, and all efforts should be made to verify any deal unless there has been a total change of political situation similar to the collapse of the Soviet Union or the regime change in South Africa, when the overall trust and confidence changed drastically. If credible verification is not feasible, a deal should better be foregone, because the damage caused by hidden noncompliance could be even greater than the benefits that the deal may accrue.

**Seek a comprehensive deal or leave some leverage for other issues**

Some argue that the denuclearization of North Korea will not take place unless there is a regime change or a total change of the body politic there. This may be true. And then it would be much easier to agree on a denuclearization deal and to implement, monitor, and verify it. But a solution under the current regime in North Korea has to be sought and assumed absent any major change there. Even then, to achieve a comprehensive deal involving not only denuclearization but also human right, humanitarian and other issues should be sought. If a step-by-step approach has to be taken, some leverage should be left to make sure that the agreed steps are certainly implemented and the remaining issues are settled in succeeding negotiations.

5. **Prospect for denuclearization**
The history of international efforts to stop the nuclear programs of North Korea, starting from the U.S.-North Korean negotiation that led to the 1994 Agreed Framework until the Six-Party Talks, has shown that North Korea either overtly or covertly continued working on nuclear weapons development that led to the nuclear test explosions in 2006 and 2009. It is not that North Korea suddenly started a weapons program in 2002 when it admitted it had uranium enrichment program and then completed an explosive device in four years. North Korea secretly continued to develop nuclear weapons while pretending to implement the 1994 denuclearization agreement.

North Korea has, in fact, made it a national priority to gain nuclear weapons and has devoted enormous resources from its impoverished economy to that end. Thus, from their point of view, it would be extremely difficult to terminate its nuclear weapons program. It would take, perhaps, even a bigger decision than Libya’s when it decided to give up its nuclear program in 2003. At the time, the Libyan program was still in its infancy and not progressing very well. North Korea, in comparison, has already succeeded in making a device that can explode. The fall of Muammar Gaddafi seems to have made North Korean determination to hang on to its nuclear program even stronger for the sake of regime survival.9

If North Korea were to agree to renounce its nuclear program today, it would require a huge rewards package that could convince it that it would be better to take the package than to keep its program. Basically, this would mean giving North Korea everything it wants. Under severe economic and financial strains, none of the Three would likely be willing to offer such rewards.

Thus, it would take a major policy change in North Korea or a regime change there for it to renounce its nuclear program. Many learned experts on North Korea say this is highly unlikely given the total isolation of the North Korean people from outside information and the firm grip of the ruling power structure. This may be true, but the cases of the Soviet Union and East Germany need to be remembered. In those days too, many Sovietologists used to say change was unlikely.

It might take some time for North Korea to realize that possession of nuclear weapons does not bring much benefit, but demands enormous additional resources to keep a robust, survivable nuclear force. Having experienced a number of disappointments, none of the Three will be easily cajoled into giving significant

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economic concessions to North Korea. With efforts to strengthen their defense and deterrence, the Three cannot be easily blackmailed to make contributions to North Korea. The recent trend is that export markets for North Korean nuclear and missile technology is shrinking.\(^\text{10}\) In the meantime, it will take a major financial investment for North Korea to build up a ballistic missile force that can survive enemy preemptive attacks. It has to be either buried deep underground, made mobile, or put under the sea.

6. A New Prospect for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone

The proposal to establish a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone is now seen in a new perspective and as a possibility that is different from that in the past. The concept\(^\text{11}\) used to be regarded by conservatives and realists as a naïve leftist idea that lacked balance and a reality check. This is because the idea only suggested that Japan and the two Koreas commit legally to denuclearize, while leaving the nuclear weapons of China and Russia untouched. This seemed one-sided from the Japanese point of view. The only thing that Japan was supposed to receive in return from China and Russia under this concept was a “negative security assurance,” i.e., a commitment not to use nuclear weapons against Japan. Again, this is an idea that conservatives did not very much buy because there was a general mistrust of the concept of a mere verbal or even a written commitment not to use nuclear weapons. They preferred the physical evidence of extended nuclear deterrence to such an unverifiable commitment.

Now that North Korea has shown that it has nuclear devices that can explode, the landscape has changed. For such a zone to be achieved, North Korea has now to dismantle its nuclear weapons program and the nuclear devices it has produced so far and commit itself to denuclearize, while Japan and South Korea only have to legally confirm their nonnuclear status. So now the bargain may not be so bad from a Japanese or South Korean perspective. At least theoretically, therefore, it is now an idea that even conservatives can endorse.


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For this zone to materialize, indeed, North Korea would have to decide to give up its nuclear program. Therefore, the chance or the difficulty of it coming to pass is equal to that of denuclearizing North Korea. The zone, therefore, may be realized as a part of a package deal that may come out of North Korean denuclearization negotiation.

7. What May Need to Be Maintained for the Time Being

Without any immediate prospect that North Korea will agree to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, the Three have to maintain their defense capability and deterrence to prevent North Korea from using or threatening to use its nuclear weapons. One of the means is to build a credible missile defense capability such as the U.S.-Japan joint development program for advanced theater missile defense. In order to avoid being blackmailed or damaged, the Three have to maintain their robust conventional defense capabilities to fend off any North Korean provocation at sea, on land, in the air or in non-conventional covert operations. As military theorists say, offense has an advantage because it is able to choose the place, time and means of attack. The defense has to be prepared at all times and in all places. This is a costly proposition, and at a time when the Three are faced with financial and economic difficulties, not an easy policy option to choose. The Three, nevertheless, can make the most of limited defense spending by improving their mutual cooperation through, e.g., information exchange, more advanced interoperability and joint exercises.

In efforts to strengthen defense and deterrence among the Three, the extent of such efforts has to be carefully calibrated so that it is not taken to be overly aggressive by the other side. This is difficult but has to be done for the purpose of eventually achieving a denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and achievement of a “world without nuclear weapons” in the Northeast Asian context. Otherwise, North Korea will be alarmed and further harden its position.

Stopping proliferation of nuclear weapons technology from North Korea, especially to terrorists and non-state actors, has become a great concern after 9/11. All efforts should be mobilized to prevent or minimize proliferation. The Nuclear Security Summit, Proliferation Security Initiative, Container Security Initiative, and Nuclear Suppliers Group all of them help, but there is no silver bullet to prevent proliferation and to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. It takes an accumulation of vigilance and tireless efforts to persevere with diverse steps to close the holes of proliferation. The coming
Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012 will provide an excellent opportunity to renew and update the awareness and efforts of countries around the world.

8. Conclusion

Achieving a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula seems as elusive a problem as ever. But for the people on the both sides of the DMZ to live in peace and without fear of nuclear devastation, the goal of denuclearized Korea cannot be given up. This is a goal Japan totally supports. Officially, no one else refuses to support it, but the question is at what price and how it is achieved. How to balance the costs and how to install a process so that the end goal of denuclearization is sure to be achieved are crucial issues. Peace has to be maintained until the goal is achieved and even after. Thus, efforts have to be made to tackle non-nuclear aspects as well so that an environment is generated for the maintenance of peace. Defense and deterrence have to be maintained until the goal is achieved, but only enough to keep the peace, not so much as to intensify the threat perception on the other side. This is another difficult balancing act, but surely one that is worth attempting.