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By Takaya SUTO
Director
Center for the Pro=
motion
of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,
Japan Institute of
International Affairs
Updated March 21, =
2008※
=
1. Introduction
=
1) As th=
e only
victim of nuclear bombs dropped in
=
2) Disar=
mament
and Non-Proliferation has special significance in
l
Three pillars of
①Japan-US Security Arrangement
②Minimum level of
③Diplomatic efforts to secure peace and stabi=
lity
of the international environment surrounding
Endeavors for global disarmament and
non-proliferation are important means for the third pillar.
l
=
2. Overview of the Global Non- proliferation and
Disarmament Regime
l
Global non-proliferation regime is facing
serious challenges.
1)&n=
bsp;
&=
nbsp; Declared
its possession of nuclear weapons (February 2005)
&=
nbsp; Missile
launch tests (July 2006)
 =
; Nuclear
test (October 2006)
2)&n=
bsp;
3)&n=
bsp;
Underground network for illegal procurement =
of nuclear
materials and equipments
4)&n=
bsp;
Threats of nuclear and other WMD terrorism
5)&n=
bsp;
The U.S.-India deal on civilian nuclear
cooperation
6)&n=
bsp;
The failure of the 2005 Review Conference of=
NPT
(May 2005) and High-level Plenary Meeting of UN General Assembly (September
2005) in producing any consensus documents
l
Basic difference among state parties in the
relative emphasis to be given to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and
peaceful use of nuclear energy
=
3. Needs for successful NPT Review Conference in
2010
NPT
is in a state of crisis and faces a risk of erosion. The Review Conference =
in
2010 needs to reestablish confidence in the NPT and strengthen it. There is=
no
realistic option to replace the NPT as a means to strengthen the internatio=
nal
disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
Keys to strengthen the NPT regime
l
Building an internationally determined polit=
ical
will
l
“Three Pillars” of the NPT need =
to
be maintained in a balanced way.
1)&n=
bsp;
Nuclear disarmament
2)&n=
bsp;
Nuclear non-proliferation
3)&n=
bsp;
Peaceful use of nuclear energy
The fundamental bargain among the thr= ee pillars must be respected. The NPT does not provide a license to the NWS to maintain their nuclear weapons indefinitely, nor does the Treaty allow for = the build-up of a nuclear weapons option under cover of civil nuclear program.<= o:p>
l
=
4. Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferat=
ion Policy
1)&n=
bsp;
The first pillar: Nuclear disarmament
l
Further reduction of nuclear weapons by nucl=
ear
weapons states
l
Early entry into force of the CTBT
=
l
Early conclusion of an FMCT, together with t=
he CTBT,
is part of the package of the indefinite extension of the NPT.
2)&n=
bsp;
The second pillar: Nuclear non-proliferation=
l
Universalization of IAEA Additional Protocol=
Japan
Japan
l
Efforts at export control regimes (NSG,
Australia Group, MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement)
l
Efforts to restrain missile activities as me=
ans
of delivering WMD (HCOC, etc.)
l
Activities to strengthen the non-proliferati=
on
regime in
 =
; e.g.
ASTOP (Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation)=
, Asi=
an
Export Control Seminar, etc.
l
Active participation in PSI and efforts to c=
all
for wider support for PSI
Six-Party
Talks:
At th=
e Second
Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks in October 2007, the part=
ies reached
agreement on the second-phase actions for the implementation of the Joint S=
tatement
of September 19 of 2005. North Korea agreed to disable all existing nuclear
facilities subject to abandonment under the September 2005 Joint Statement =
and the Feb=
ruary
13 agreement, and to provide a complete and correct declaration =
of
all its nuclear programs in accordance with the February 13 agreement by 31
December 2007. To advance six-party’s common goal to achieve early
denuclearization of the
For <=
st1:country-region
w:st=3D"on">Japan, abduction cases must be resolved be=
fore
resuming economic aid to
February
2006
&=
nbsp; IAEA
Board of Governors reported non-compliance of
July
2006
&=
nbsp; UNSC
adopted resolution 1696.
December
2006
&=
nbsp; UNSC
adopted resolution 1737.
March
2007
&=
nbsp; UNSC
adopted resolution 1747.
March
2008
&=
nbsp; UNSC
adopted resolution 1803.
Japan
requests Iran to take the Security Council resolutions seriously and to take
all necessary actions including full cooperation with the IAEA,[<=
/span>③]
the prompt ratification and full implementation of the Additional Protocol,=
and
to go back to a negotiating table on the basis of six countries’ prop=
osal
(June 2006).
When
there is non-compliance with the safeguards agreement (Article III), rectif=
ying
the non-compliance and building confidence are prerequisite for exercising =
the
right.
US-India Nuclear Deal
i)Pros =
and cons
of the deal
<Arguments for the deal>
①Strengthen the strategic partnership between
②Strengthen the
energy security.
③Promote environmental protection.
④Expand busine=
ss
opportunities.
⑤Strengthe=
n international
non-proliferation regime by engaging
&=
nbsp;
<Arguments against the deal>
①Undermines non-proliferation regime
・
Recognizes
・
Contradicts the NPT’s basic deal recei=
ving
assistance for peaceful use of nuclear energy in return for abandonment of
nuclear weapons.
・
Rewards countries that have developed nuclear
weapons under the pretext of civilian use of nuclear energy.
・
May lead to an increasing recognition that
nuclear weapons could enhance nation’s power.
・
Makes it difficult to limit nuclear cooperat=
ion
to other potential nuclear proliferating countries.
・
May result in assisting
ii)
The
Resolution on the
No
progress has been made since then. Need to make progress to achieve this
objective.
3)&n=
bsp;
The third pillar: Peaceful use of nuclear en=
ergy
l
Role model in the international community as=
a
non-nuclear weapon State successfully utilizing nuclear energy, while ensur=
ing
high transparency in its nuclear activities
l
Contribution to international activities to
promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to strengthen nuclear safety and
security[<=
/span>④]
※ This abstract was firs=
tly
distributed for the Public Lecture at the Center for Strategic Research,
[=
9312;]=
Under
the Constitution (Article 9),
[= 9313;]= A/RES/62/37, 5 December 2007.
[=
9314;]=
The
Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in =
[=
9315;]=
Taskforce
on Atoms for the Sustainable Future, Japan Institute of International Affai=
rs,
made a policy recommendation, entitled “Atoms for the Sustainable Fut=
ure:
Recommendations on Nuclear Energy in the 21st Century,”
January 2008 <http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/polcy_report/pr20080109_prop=
osal.pdf>.