Japan’s Policy for Global Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

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1. Introduction

1) As the only victim of nuclear bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japanese people have strong sentiment against nuclear weapons (nuclear taboo or nuclear allergy). Japan is strictly observing the “Three Non-nuclear Principles”; not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons to Japan. Japan is also refraining from exporting weapons to foreign countries. Also the use of nuclear energy is strictly limited to peaceful purpose by national legislation and under the IAEA safeguards.

2) Disarmament and Non-Proliferation has special significance in Japan’s foreign policy.
   - Three pillars of Japan’s security policy
     ① Japan-US Security Arrangement
     ② Minimum level of Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF)
     ③ Diplomatic efforts to secure peace and stability of the international environment surrounding Japan

   Endeavors for global disarmament and non-proliferation are important means for the third pillar.

   • Japan’s policy is based on both humanitarian approach (including human security) and need for ensuring security environment surrounding Japan (Calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons while depending on the US’s nuclear umbrella).

2. Overview of the Global Non-proliferation and Disarmament Regime

- Global non-proliferation regime is facing serious challenges.

  1) North Korea
     Declared its possession of nuclear weapons (February 2005)
     Missile launch tests (July 2006)
Nuclear test (October 2006)
2) Iran’s nuclear program causing concerns in the international community
3) Underground network for illegal procurement of nuclear materials and equipments
4) Threats of nuclear and other WMD terrorism
5) The U.S.-India deal on civilian nuclear cooperation
6) The failure of the 2005 Review Conference of NPT (May 2005) and High-level Plenary Meeting of UN General Assembly (September 2005) in producing any consensus documents
   • Basic difference among state parties in the relative emphasis to be given to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy

3. **Needs for successful NPT Review Conference in 2010**

   NPT is in a state of crisis and faces a risk of erosion. The Review Conference in 2010 needs to reestablish confidence in the NPT and strengthen it. There is no realistic option to replace the NPT as a means to strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

   **Keys to strengthen the NPT regime**
   • Building an internationally determined political will
   • “Three Pillars” of the NPT need to be maintained in a balanced way.
   1) Nuclear disarmament
   2) Nuclear non-proliferation
   3) Peaceful use of nuclear energy

   The fundamental bargain among the three pillars must be respected. The NPT does not provide a license to the NWS to maintain their nuclear weapons indefinitely, nor does the Treaty allow for the build-up of a nuclear weapons option under cover of civil nuclear program.

   • Japan chaired the First Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference (April 30 to May 11). Ambassador Amano did his best for a smooth and successful start of the review process.

4. **Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy**

   Japan has been actively making diplomatic efforts to promote nuclear disarmament through a practical and progressive approach in order to realize a peaceful and safe world free from nuclear weapons.

   Japan has continuously submitted draft resolutions on nuclear disarmament since 1994. The current policy of Japan is best envisioned in the General Assembly Resolution entitled “Renewed Determination towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.”

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1) The first pillar: Nuclear disarmament
- Further reduction of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapons states
- Early entry into force of the CTBT
  Japan places great importance on the early entry into force of the CTBT. Japan has taken various initiatives to universalize the CTBT. 178 countries already signed the CTBT, and 144 countries ratified so far. The following nine countries need to ratify the Treaty for its entry into force: **US, China, North Korea, Iran, Egypt, Israel, India, Pakistan, Indonesia**.
- Early conclusion of an FMCT, together with the CTBT, is part of the package of the indefinite extension of the NPT. Japan emphasizes the importance and urgency of the commencement and conclusion of the FMCT negotiations at the Conference of Disarmament.

2) The second pillar: Nuclear non-proliferation
- Universalization of IAEA Additional Protocol
  Japan attaches great importance to the IAEA safeguards system which reinforces the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation based on the NPT through controlling nuclear materials.

  Japan has been taking an important initiative to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, especially through universalization of the Additional Protocol.
- Efforts at export control regimes (NSG, Australia Group, MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement)
- Efforts to restrain missile activities as means of delivering WMD (HCOC, etc.)
- Activities to strengthen the non-proliferation regime in Asia
  e.g. ASTOP (Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation), Asian Export Control Seminar, etc.
- Active participation in PSI and efforts to call for wider support for PSI

**North Korea:**
Japan cannot accept, by any means, any development, acquisition or possession, test and transfer of nuclear weapons by North Korea.

Japan strongly urges North Korea to comply with all international agreements related to nuclear issues, including the NPT and IAEA safeguards agreement, and to take prompt actions to dismantle its whole nuclear programs. Japan played an active role in adopting Security Council resolutions 1695 (July 2006) and 1718 (November 2006).

**Six-Party Talks:**
At the Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks in October 2007, the
parties reached agreement on the second-phase actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement of September 19 of 2005. North Korea agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to abandonment under the September 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 agreement, and to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs in accordance with the February 13 agreement by 31 December 2007. To advance six-party’s common goal to achieve early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, North Korea should implement its commitments. For Japan, abduction cases must be resolved before resuming economic aid to North Korea.

Iran:
February 2006
IAEA Board of Governors reported non-compliance of Iran to the UNSC.
July 2006
UNSC adopted resolution 1696.
December 2006
UNSC adopted resolution 1737.
March 2007
UNSC adopted resolution 1747.
March 2008
UNSC adopted resolution 1803.
Japan requests Iran to take the Security Council resolutions seriously and to take all necessary actions including full cooperation with the IAEA, the prompt ratification and full implementation of the Additional Protocol, and to go back to a negotiating table on the basis of six countries’ proposal (June 2006).
Japan recognizes the inalienable right of all the state parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, this right has to be executed in conformity with the Articles I, II and III of the Treaty.
When there is non-compliance with the safeguards agreement (Article III), rectifying the non-compliance and building confidence are prerequisite for exercising the right.

US-India Nuclear Deal
i) Pros and cons of the deal
<Arguments for the deal>
① Strengthen the strategic partnership between U.S. and India.
② Strengthen the energy security.
③ Promote environmental protection.

The Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. The Agency remains unable, however, to make further progress in its efforts to verify fully the past development of Iran’s nuclear programme and certain aspects relevant to its scope and nature. Hence, the Agency is unable to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless Iran addresses the long outstanding verification issues through the implementation of the Additional Protocol (which it signed on 18 December 2003, but has not yet brought into force) and the required transparency measures. (Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors, 22 February 2007)
④ Expand business opportunities.
⑤ Strengthen international non-proliferation regime by engaging India.

<Arguments against the deal>
① Undermines non-proliferation regime
   • Recognizes India as an actual nuclear weapon state.
   • Contradicts the NPT’s basic deal receiving assistance for peaceful use of nuclear energy in return for abandonment of nuclear weapons.
   • Rewards countries that have developed nuclear weapons under the pretext of civilian use of nuclear energy.
   • May lead to an increasing recognition that nuclear weapons could enhance nation’s power.
   • Makes it difficult to limit nuclear cooperation to other potential nuclear proliferating countries.
   • May result in assisting India to produce more fissile materials for weapons if production of such materials is not banned or limited. (cf. NPT Article I)

ii) Japan’s final position has not yet been decided.

Middle East:
The Resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference called for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. It is a part of the package for an indefinite extension of the NPT. Japan supports the Resolution.
No progress has been made since then. Need to make progress to achieve this objective.

3) The third pillar: Peaceful use of nuclear energy
Japan operates 55 nuclear reactors, providing about 30% of total electricity supply in Japan under strict IAEA safeguards.
Japan also pursues nuclear fuel cycle program with intrusive verification by the IAEA. Integrated safeguard has been applied to Japan since September 2004, after the IAEA has concluded that there has been no indication of diversion of nuclear materials from declared facilities, or of existence of undeclared nuclear activities or materials.
   • Role model in the international community as a non-nuclear weapon State successfully utilizing nuclear energy, while ensuring high transparency in its nuclear activities
   • Contribution to international activities to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to strengthen nuclear safety and security①

Japan is actively participating in the international discussion for a multi-lateral mechanism to guarantee supply of nuclear fuel.